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1 TO ALL PARTIES AND TO THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD: 2 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that, at such time as the matter may be heard if a 3 hearing is ordered in this matter, before the Honorable Dale S. Fischer, United States District Judge, in Courtroom 840 of the United States District Court, Roybal Federal 4 Building and Courthouse, 255 East Temple Street, Los Angeles, California, Plaintiff 5 the Los Angeles Gay & Lesbian Community Services Center will and hereby does 6 7 move for an order establishing the amount of attorneys' fees and costs under the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"), 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E). 8 This motion is based upon this Notice, the accompanying Memorandum of 9 10 Points and Authorities, declarations and exhibits, all pleadings and papers filed in this action, and upon such evidence as may be presented at a hearing of this motion. 11 12 Dated: January 23, 2008 Dean Hansell Mark J. Nagle 13 Heather L. Capell (not admitted in California) Boaz I. Green (not admitted in California) 14 DEWEY & LEBOEUF LLP 15 Zan Hansell/2 16 17 Attorneys for Plaintiff THE LOS ANGELES GAY AND 18 LESBIAN COMMUNITY SERVICES CENTER 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26

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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff, the Los Angeles Gay and Lesbian Community Services Center (the "Center"), is eligible for, and entitled to, attorneys' fees and litigation costs, incurred in its litigation with Defendant Internal Revenue Service ("IRS"), under the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"), 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E) and now moves for an award of such fees and costs. On March 21, 2005, the Center sent separate information requests under 5 U.S.C. § 552 of FOIA to five IRS locations, seeking documents related to its application for 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status. In violation of its duties under the FOIA, the IRS failed to conduct any search for responsive documents until after the Center was forced to file suit on September 26, 2006. Further, it was not until January of 2007 (20 months after the FOIA requests were sent and 4 months after the suit was filed) that the IRS produced any responsive documents. Additionally, as this Court found in its August 27, 2007 Order Denying Defendant IRS's Motion for Summary Judgment ("the Order"), even the searches that the IRS conducted after the litigation commenced were inadequate under FOIA. This Court therefore ordered the IRS to conduct additional searches for documents.

Because the Center was forced to bring this action in order to receive a response to its FOIA requests and because the IRS failed to conduct an adequate search for responsive documents even after the litigation commenced, *pro bono* counsel for the Center has devoted significant attorney time, and incurred significant litigation costs in representing the Center in this matter. Counsel's services included, among other things: drafting and filing the Complaint, communicating with the Center about developing a strategy, retrieving and producing documents to the IRS, reviewing the IRS's document productions, conducting 30(b)(6) depositions of two IRS employees in Washington, D.C., responding to a late-filed IRS Motion for Summary Judgment, preparing for trial, preparing for and attending two telephonic settlement conferences, and negotiating the language of the Court ordered stipulation. The Center now moves

1 | for an order awarding attorneys' fees and litigation costs incurred by its *pro bono* 2 | counsel.

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II. SUMMARY OF FACTS

On March 21, 2005, the Center, through its attorneys, LeBoeuf, Lamb, Greene & MacRae LLP (now Dewey & LeBoeuf LLP), sent FOIA requests to IRS offices in Cincinnati, Ohio ("Cincinnati Office"), Ogden, Utah ("Ogden Office"), Fresno, California ("Fresno Office"), Laguna Niguel, California ("Laguna Office"), and Washington, D.C. ("Washington Office") seeking documents related to its application for 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status, the original denial letter, subsequent ruling letter granting tax-exempt status with certain restrictions, and the reissued ruling letter removing these restrictions. (Order at 2.) The Center did not receive any responsive documents from the IRS for over 18 months. During this period, Center's counsel sent letters to IRS offices urging them to respond to the Center's FOIA requests, but no responsive documents were received. (April 11, 2005 letter from Dean Hansell to Kathlyne Morris; April 13, 2005 letter from Dean Hansell to Marla McKenzie, attached as Ex. 1 to Declaration of Mark Nagle in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Litigation Costs ("Nagle Decl.").) Thus, the Center was forced to sue the IRS on September 26, 2006. (Order at 2.) The IRS admits that it did not conduct a search for documents related to the Center's FOIA request until after this litigation was filed. (Mikolashek 5/10/07 Deposition at 110:22-114:6, Ex. 21 to Declaration of Mark Nagle in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.; Declaration of Adrienne Mikolashek in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment ¶¶ 12-17 (pages 5-6) ("Mikolashek Decl.").)

After the Center submitted its FOIA requests, the IRS's Ogden, Fresno, and Laguna Offices, in violation of FOIA, declined to conduct the required searches and instead merely referred the FOIA requests to the Exempt Organizations Determination Office in Cincinnati. (Order at 2-3.) The Ogden, Fresno, and Laguna Offices took no further action on the Center's requests. (*Id.* at 2.) Even after the Center filed the

lawsuit, the IRS initially conducted searches of only its Washington and Cincinnati Offices. (*Id.* at 3.) The IRS's search of its Washington Office located 29 pages of responsive documents, which it turned over to the Center on January 3, 2007, nearly 4 months after the litigation commenced. (*Id.*) Because the Center was organized and located in California, John Bailey, a Supervisory Internal Revenue Agent in the Cincinnati Office, asked the IRS's office in El Monte, California ("El Monte Office") if any documents that should have been transferred to the Cincinnati Office had been retained there. (*Id.* at 3.) He was told that no such documents were located in the El Monte Office. (*Id.*) The IRS, however, failed to provide a detailed declaration describing the search conducted at the El Monte Office. (*Id.* at 6.)

In the IRS's responses to discovery requests on February 12, 2007, the IRS agreed in writing to produce supplemental search declarations to the Center within 10 days, which it failed to provide within the time specified. It was not until March 28, 2007, that the IRS produced any of the promised supplemental search declarations meant to potentially obviate the need for depositions. However, at that time, the IRS failed to produce a declaration for Adrienne Mikolashek, who coordinated the searches. In the absence of sufficient declarations detailing the searches that the IRS conducted, the Center proceeded with 30(b)(6) depositions of IRS designees in Washington, D.C. These depositions required counsel to involve additional attorneys in its local Washington, D.C. office. The IRS did not inform the Center's counsel that it would be providing two deponents and did not inform counsel of their identities until a day before the deposition. Moreover, to accommodate the schedules of the IRS's designees, Mr. Bailey and Ms. Mikolashek, counsel for the Center agreed to cut short its deposition time with Ms. Mikolashek and schedule a second session with her. At the second session on May 10, 2007, the IRS produced another 4 responsive documents to the Center (Declaration of Dean Hansell in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment ¶ 10.)

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At the Local Rule 7-3 conference of counsel on June 20, 2007, the Center detailed for the IRS why it needed additional information regarding the searches conducted and requested that the IRS provide supplemental declarations to assist the Center in determining the adequacy of the searches conducted. The IRS's attorney said that they intended to file a motion for summary judgment and have a court declare that the search conducted was adequate. In a letter sent to the IRS on June 22, 2007, counsel for the Center urged the IRS not to file a motion on the adequacy of the search and instead provide the requested declarations to help establish the adequacy of the search conducted. (June 22, 2007 Letter from Dean Hansell to Gerald Role, attached as Ex. 2 to Nagle Decl.) However, the IRS proceeded to file a late motion for summary judgment, arguing that it conducted a reasonable search for documents and thereby discharged its duties under FOIA, which the Center was forced to oppose. (Order at 4.) This Court denied the IRS's motion in its August 27, 2007 Order, finding that the IRS's "own evidence suggested that the search conducted was not reasonable." (Id. at 8.) This Court found, among other things, that responsive documents may be located "either in offices to which [the Center] directed its request or in the offices of IRS senior management." (Id. at 7-8.) Consequently, this Court, in the Civil Minutes of the August 27, 2007 Hearing on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, ordered that the IRS conduct further searches for the requested documents pursuant to a joint stipulation to be entered into by the Parties.

In order to facilitate the Parties' compliance with this Court's Order, the Center sent a proposed stipulation to the IRS on September 12, 2007, based largely on the language of the Order. The Center's main objective in drafting the stipulation was to ensure that the additional searches the IRS would conduct would be both adequate and well documented, such that any future disputes regarding the IRS's compliance with its statutory obligations to respond to the Center's FOIA requests would be averted. The Center anticipated that, based on the Order's clarity about the searches to be conducted, the Parties would readily agree to the stipulation's language. However,

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despite the Center's efforts to expedite the process, the IRS took over 2 months to agree to the filed stipulation's language. During this period, significant attorney time was devoted to activities related to the stipulation, including lengthy telephonic meetings between the Parties and the exchange of numerous drafts of the stipulation. On November 15, 2007, over 2 months after the Court's August 27, 2007 Order, the Parties were finally able to file a stipulation as to the searches to be conducted.

The Parties have attempted to settle the issue of attorneys' fees and litigation costs prior to the Center's filing of this motion. The Parties had an initial telephonic settlement conference on September 11, 2007, with Magistrate Judge Fernando Olguin, where the IRS appeared willing to enter settlement negotiations on the issue of attorneys' fees and litigation costs. Therefore, at the telephonic settlement conference Magistrate Judge Olguin instructed the Center to provide a settlement demand letter to the IRS, to which the IRS was to respond. Magistrate Judge Olguin scheduled a further settlement conference for October 4, 2007 (Civil Minutes of September 11, 2007 Telephonic Settlement Conference 7, attached as Ex. 3 to Nagle Decl.) The Center and the IRS had a final telephonic settlement conference with Magistrate Judge Olguin on October 4, 2007, where the Parties agreed that a settlement of the issue was not possible. (Civil Minutes of October 4, 2007 Telephonic Settlement Conference, attached as Ex. 4 to Nagle Decl.)

III. ARGUMENT

The Center is both eligible for, and entitled to, attorneys' fees and litigation costs under 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E). Under FOIA, "[t]he court may assess against the United States reasonable attorney fees and other litigation costs reasonably incurred in any case under this section in which the complainant has substantially prevailed." 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E). This fee-shifting provision helps ensure that agencies properly perform their duty to disclose government information to the public, thereby encouraging a policy of open government. *See, e.g., Northcross v. Bd. of Educ. of Memphis City Schs.*, 412 U.S. 427 (1973) (fee-shifting provision encourages

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individuals to seek judicial relief for the purpose of vindicating national policy); *Cuneo v. Rumsfeld*, 553 F.2d 1360, 1363-1364 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (fee-shifting provides incentive to government agencies to comply with FOIA requests); *Goldstein v. Levi*, 415 F. Supp. 303, 305 (D.D.C. 1976) (fee-shifting provision helps ensure that agencies properly perform their duty to disclose government information to the public). In order to be awarded attorneys' fees, a complainant must establish both (1) eligibility for and (2) entitlement to fees. *See Long v. IRS*, 932 F.2d 1309, 1311-13 (9th Cir. 1991); *see also O'Neill, Lysaght & Sun v. Drug Enforcement Admin.*, 951 F.Supp. 1413, 1418 (C.D. Cal. 1996).

Pro bono counsel is authorized to receive attorneys' fees and litigation costs under Section 552(a)(4)(E) of FOIA. See Rosenfeld v. FBI, 859 F.2d 717, 723 (9th Cir. 1988); see also U.S. v. \$12,248 U.S. Currency, 957 F.2d 1513, 1521 (9th Cir. 1991) (award of attorneys' fees to pro bono counsel appropriate as means to ensure adequate legal representation to litigants); Powell v. Dep't of Justice, 569 F. Supp. 1192 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (counsel entitled to compensation over lodestar amount to compensate for risk assumed when representing a client pro bono).

A. The Center is Eligible for Attorneys' Fees and Litigation Costs Because it has "Substantially Prevailed" in the Litigation

The Court may assess against the United States reasonable attorneys' fees and other litigation costs reasonably incurred in any case under 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E) in which the complainant has "substantially prevailed." *Church of Scientology of California v. U.S. Postal Serv.*, 700 F.2d 486, 489 (9th Cir. 1983) ("if the facts show that the plaintiff has substantially prevailed on his or her FOIA action, then such party is eligible for an award of attorney's fees"); *accord Weatherhead v. U.S.*, 112 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1064 (E.D. Wash. 2000). A party "substantially prevails" where (1) the FOIA action was "reasonably necessary" to obtain the information sought; and (2) the action had a "substantial causative effect" on delivery of the information. *Exner v. Federal Bureau of Investigation*, 443 F.Supp. 1349, 1353 (S.D. Cal. 1978), *aff'd*, 612

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F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1980); accord Long, 932 F.2d at 1313. However, a plaintiff need not win complete relief to have "substantially prevailed." A prevailing party is one who has been awarded some relief by a court. See, e.g., Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home v. W. Va. Dep't of Heath & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 603 (2001). Even where no documents are released, a plaintiff may be deemed to have "substantially prevailed" if the suit compels an agency to comply with the law. Halperin v. Dep't of State, 565 F.2d 699, 706 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1977).

Here, the Center is eligible for attorneys' fees and litigation costs because this litigation was "reasonably necessary," and had a direct causative effect on the delivery of information. Moreover, this Court's Order required the IRS to conduct additional searches, thereby altering the legal relationship between the Parties.

The Center's Filing of this Legal Action Was Reasonably **Necessary to Obtain the Information Sought.**

In determining whether a legal action is "reasonably necessary" to obtain the information sought, courts consider (1) the length of time between the plaintiff's initial request for information and plaintiff's filing of the suit, and (2) whether there was a reasonable explanation for the government's delay in turning over the requested information prior to litigation. Weatherhead, 112 F. Supp. 2d at 1064. Reasonable necessity generally exists where the defendant agency would not have searched for files or released them in the absence of litigation. Church of Scientology of California v. Harris, 653 F.2d 584, 588 (D.D.C. 1981). This is true even where the agency discloses the information voluntarily after litigation has begun. See, e.g., Goldstein, 415 F.Supp. at 305 (purpose of fee provision would be defeated if plaintiffs were forced to forfeit their claim upon surrender of materials before formal action by judge). Courts also consider "whether the agency, upon actual and reasonable notice

¹ In Buckhannon, the Supreme Court, in interpreting the meaning of the word "prevailed," rejected a theory based on the causative effect of the litigation because it "allows an award where there is no judicially sanctioned change in the legal relationship of the parties." 532 U.S. at 603. The Court instead held that a "'prevailing party' is one who has been awarded some relief by the court." Id. This casts some doubt on the viability of the causative effect or catalyst theory. However, the Ninth Circuit has yet to apply the Buckhannon standard. Thus, here we apply both standards.

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of the request, made a good-faith effort to search out the material and to pass on whether it should be disclosed." *Church of Scientology of California v. U.S. Postal Serv.*, 700 F.2d at 491 (9th Cir. 1983).

Here, the IRS did not make a good faith effort to search for requested documents and comply with the FOIA's mandates. The Center waited to file its Complaint until September 26, 2006 – a year and a half after its FOIA requests were sent. It was not until after the Center filed its Complaint that the IRS began to search for responsive documents. (See Order at 2-3; Mikolashek 5/10/07 Deposition at 110:22-113:8, Ex. 21 to Declaration of Mark Nagle in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment; Declaration of John Bailey in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment; Declaration of Darla Trilli in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.) The IRS has provided no explanation for why a search was not conducted in the 18 months prior to the Center's filing of this litigation. Therefore, there is no evidence that the IRS "would have searched for files or released them in absence of litigation." Church of Scientology of California v. Harris, 653 F.2d at 588. Further, the IRS failed to make a good faith effort to search for documents even after this litigation commenced. This Court found that the IRS's search for documents after the litigation commenced was inadequate under FOIA. (Order at 8.) Thus, it is clear that this litigation was "reasonably necessary" to obtain the information the Center is entitled to under FOIA.

ii. The Center's Filing of this Legal Action Caused the Delivery of the Requested Information.

The second factor courts consider in determining eligibility is whether a plaintiff's FOIA action caused the delivery of requested information. *Exner v. FBI*, 443 F. Supp. at 1353. A causal connection is established where documents are released in conjunction with a court order. *See Church of Scientology Western U.S. v. IRS*, 769 F. Supp. 328, 330-331 (C.D. Cal. 1991); *see also Guam Contractors Ass'n v. U.S. Dep't of Labor*, 570 F. Supp. 163, 165 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (release of documents by